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Many major subjects require familiarity with statistical 
tools such as collecting, organizing, and presenting data, as 
well as reasoning about probability and drawing inferences. 
Unfortunately, many students enter college with very little 
formal experience with the laws of probability and proba-
bilistic reasoning. Moreover, they may develop their own 
way of reasoning about uncertain events through informal 
experiences. 
Literature on probabilistic intuitive reasoning has shown 
that adults as well as children committed several errors 
when problems were referred to everyday life frames (Dav-
idson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). It was supposed 
that real life frames could hide relevant information for the 
correct resolution and that concrete situations (e.g. sports, 
games) can activate non-relevant cues compared to abstract 
situations (e.g. tossing a coin). Moreover, as in the previ-
ous case, real life frames with references to stereotypes (e.g. 
gender stereotype) are often associated with non-normative 
strategies (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Hamilton & Gif-
ford, 1976; Schaller, 1992), because judgments are based 
on stereotypical information that can cause misconceptions. 
A concrete early illustration of the effect of real life frame 
was provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). A trivial 
rule of probability theory asserts that the probability of a 
single event (A) is always greater than, or at least equal to 
the probability of the intersection of the same event with 
another event (A&B). However, giving a description like 
“Bill is 34 years old ... an intelligent, but unimaginative, 
compulsive, and generally lifeless man who was strong in 
school in mathematics but weak in social studies and the 
humanities”, people were likely to give a higher rating to 
the probability P(A&B) = “Bill is an accountant who plays 
jazz for a hobby” than to the probability P(A) = “Bill plays 
jazz for a hobby” (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1983). The rep-
resentativeness of the stereotypical information can explain 
why people neglect the normative principle.
Among the various probabilistic misconceptions, this 
paper focused on the gambler’s fallacy (Boynton, 2003; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993; Yackulic & Kelly, 1984; Winefield, 1966), a mistake 
related to probabilistic judgment about sequences of inde-
pendent outcomes. This bias emerges when probability is 
estimated on the basis of what happened before, ignoring 
the independence of events. For example, referring to the 
Black (B) and Red (R) outcomes of a roulette wheel, we 
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The aim of the present work is to improve knowledge about how students think about probability in order to 
find educational methods intended to eliminate misconceptions. The role of task frames and training on reasoning 
about sequences of independent outcomes was investigated. Three types of frames have been compared: abstract, 
concrete, and concrete plus reference to stereotypes. Tasks were administered to two groups of students: one group 
had followed a brief course on probability, the other had not. Frames influenced the use of normative strategies as 
well as training, whereas some students, even after the training, continued to hold misconceptions. In particular, the 
use of normative strategies was more likely in abstract frames. This effect held both for training and non-training 
group. However, training group was more prone to avoid mistakes in concrete plus reference to stereotypes frames. 
Results suggest that these tasks can be used to illustrate normative responses and biases in teaching probability.
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have to judge the more likely event after a sequence as ‘R 
R R R’. According to the normative principle, each spin is 
independent from the other and the probabilities of R and B 
remain the same, regardless which sequence of outcome has 
been produced. According to the non-normative reasoning, 
B outcome can erroneously be considered more likely than R 
one, i.e. gambler fallacy. Inside statistics education research, 
Hirsch & O’Donnel (2001) proposed a valid and reliable test 
instrument to identify students who hold misconceptions re-
lated to this kind of problems. Their test proposed 16 two-
part items with abstract scenarios (e.g. tossing a coin or roll-
ing a dice). In the first part of an item, students choose the 
correct answer to a problem stem from among five options. 
In the second part, students justified their answer in part one 
by selecting from a number of explanations. Based on their 
responses to both parts of each pair of items, they found that 
about the 60% of the whole sample answered correctly.
Misconception may be due to a lack of experience with 
mathematical laws, for instance, some studies (Fong & Nis-
bett, 1991; Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Lehman, Lem-
pert, & Nisbett, 1988) reported that experts in statistics and 
probability theory are more likely to adopt normative strate-
gies of resolution, but there is an evidence that misconcep-
tions about the laws of chance are still common among peo-
ple who received a formal training (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2000). Hirsch & O’Donnel (2001), administering the test 
described above to assess the effects of instructional inter-
ventions, reported that although formal instruction appears 
to reduce the proportion of students who gave incorrect an-
swers, a substantial number of students with formal training 
continues to have misconceptions. 
In his reflections on teaching statistics and probability, 
Shaughnessy (1992) stressed the need to develop consistent 
methods of assessment that more accurately reflect student’s 
conceptual understanding. As a matter of fact, the more ac-
curately students’ conceptual understanding of probability 
is assessed, the more effective instructional methods intend-
ed to eliminate misconception can be proposed (Garfield, 
2002; Konold, 1991, 1995). However, few studies in the ed-
ucational assessment field examined carefully the scenarios 
and their role in inducing different strategies of resolution, 
i.e. normative vs non-normative.
Following these assumptions, the aim of present re-
search was to examine how students think about probabil-
ity, to ascertain when misconceptions occur, and to explore 
the effect of formal training on probabilistic reasoning. In 
particular, it was hypothesized that problems with different 
frames can be helpful to assess both the normative and non-
normative reasoning, and that correct answers and fallacies 
could be related to the different task scenarios. We are ex-
pecting that participants will use more normative strategy in 
tasks with abstract scenario and vice versa as the literature 
suggests (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Hamilton & Gifford, 
1976; Schaller, 1992). In addition, formal training could be 
effective in reducing errors depending on the scenarios. For 
instance, it can be thought that the instruction they received 
was effective and that they use it independently from the 
problem frames. Alternatively, students could maintain an 
own way of reasoning about uncertain events characterized 
by real life scenarios, whereas they might apply correctly 
the normative rule in abstract scenarios. 
We employ as a starting point the test created by Hir-
sch & O’Donnel (2001). They proposed 16 multiple choice 
items with abstract scenarios, e.g. classical frame employed 
in teaching probability (rolling a dice, tossing a coin, picking 
an object from a bag without describing who rolls the dice, 
why, and his/her motivation). Based on the above, tests for-
mally similar but with two different scenarios (concrete and 
stereotypical) were developed. Concrete scenario presents 
situations in which a random experiment was held, for ex-
ample, the owner of a factory that wants to select randomly 
an employee. Concrete with stereotypical information was 
very similar to the previous frame, for example, the owner 
of a factory that wants to select an employee among Italian 
and immigrant workers. 
In sum, we aimed to investigate the occurrence of norma-
tive and non-normative responses in students that had received 
vs. did not have received a brief training in probability. 
METHOD
Participants
Undergraduate students in Psychology major (N = 473, 
83.9% female, average age 20.8 ± 4.2) attending introduc-
tory statistics courses at the University of Florence partici-
pated in the study. Participation was voluntary. Students 
were offered extra credit to complete the test.
Measure
We prepared a test in three different versions, each one 
containing six items. The Abstract version was derived di-
rectly from the instrument created by Hirsch & O’Donnel 
(2001) choosing 6 items from the original version. The other 
two versions (Concrete and Stereotypical) were developed 
keeping constant the formal content of the problems of 
the Abstract version but changing the scenario. An index 
of readability derived from Gunning Fog Index (Gunning, 
1952) and adapted for the Italian language (total number 
of words divided by all independent clauses, and added the 
number of difficult words defined as those with five or more 
syllables) was calculated to evaluate the formal equivalence 
among the three tests. A small sample (n = 9) was adminis-
tered the three versions and requested to estimate the clear-
ness of the different contents that resulted equally simple to 
understand. At last, the three versions were characterized by 
the same reading and understanding difficulties.
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Each test item was composed of two parts. The first part 
asked students for an assessment of probability. The second 
part asked students to identify specific justification for their 
answer to the first part. Both answer and justification were 
given in a multiple-choice format (one correct among five 
choices). 
The Abstract version employed problems that present 
classical situations used in teaching probability. For exam-
ple:
If a fair coin is tossed ten times, which of the following 
ordered sequences of heads (H) and tails (T), if any, is most 
likely to occur?
H H H T H T H H T H
H H H H H H H H H H
H T H T H T H T H T 
T T H T H T T T H H
All sequences are equally likely.
Which of the following best describes the reason for your 
answer to the preceding question?
Since tossing a coin is random you should not get a long 
string of heads or tails.
Every sequence of ten tosses has exactly the same prob-
ability of occurring.
There ought to be roughly the same number of tails as 
heads.
Since tossing a coin is random, the coin should not alter-
nate between heads and tails.
Other.
The normative criterion solution claims that for any new 
toss we have one favorable event and two possible events 
(p=1/2), independently of what happened before. Non-nor-
mative strategies conduct to estimate the second event more 
or less likely to occur on the basis of the fist one, producing 
the gambler fallacy bias. 
In the same way the Concrete and Stereotypical version 
presented items formally equivalent in which independence 
was implicitly assumed. For example:
Piero has taken a history test (composed by 10 true/false 
questions) responding at chance. Which of the following or-
dered sequences of correct or wrong responses, if any, is 
most likely to occur? (Concrete).
Medina, a girl belonging to the gipsy community, has 
taken a history test (composed by 10 true/false questions) 
responding at chance. Which of the following ordered se-
quences of correct or wrong responses, if any, is most likely 
to occur? (Stereotypical). 
As in the Abstract version, items were followed by an-
swer and justification in a multiple-choice format. For ex-
ample:
W W W C W C W W C W
W W W W W W W W W W
W C W C W C W C W C 
C C W C W C C C W W
All sequences are equally likely.
Which of the following best describes the reason for your 
answer to the preceding question?
Since responding at chance you should not get a long 
string of correct or wrong responses.
Every sequence of ten responses has exactly the same 
probability of occurring.
There ought to be roughly the same number of correct or 
wrong responses.
Responding at chance, the responses should not alter-
nate between correct or wrong.
Other.
Finally, each version was composed of six items that 
were presented in a random order.
Procedure
Each participant was administered one of the three ver-
sions of the test during course activity: 282 students (Non-
training group) received the test before following lessons 
on probability (in detail, 94 students received the Abstract, 
91 the Concrete, and 97 the Stereotypical version), while 
191 students (Training group) received the test after fol-
lowing lessons on probability (in detail, 66 received the Ab-
stract, 65 the Concrete, and 60 the Stereotypical version). 
Students were randomly assigned to the two groups and, 
within each groups, they received randomly different test 
version. Training group attended four lessons (each one 2 
hours long). Lessons focused on basic rules of probabil-
ity calculus (random experiments, probability of simple 
events, probability of mutually exclusive and mutually 
non-exclusive events, probability of independent and de-
pendent events) and examples made by the teacher were 
different from the experiment tasks. Moreover, no special 
attention was given to dispelling students’ reliance on their 
intuitive reasoning and to compare intuitive versus norma-
tive reasoning. 
Students were explicitly told that the study focused on 
probabilistic reasoning and that the test was not adminis-
tered for assessment purpose. They were requested to com-
plete the task individually. There was not time limit and the 
test took 15 minutes on the average.
Successively, results were reported to the students in or-
der to explain the rationale of the research. 
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RESULTS
Examining the two parts of each item, a score based on 
the combined response to both parts was obtained. The item 
was scored as correct if the justification was consistent with 
the probability assessment (e.g. answer: “All sequences are 
equally likely”, and justification: “Every sequence of ten 
tosses has exactly the same probability of occurring”). A to-
tal score for the test was obtained by summing the number 
of correct responses (ranged from 0 to 6 points). The stand-
ardized values of skewness (z = -13.93, p< .001) and kur-
tosis (z = 7.46, p< .001) indicated a strong departure from 
normal distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Therefore, 
the scores were transformed into a dichotomous variable 
(labeled Probabilistic Reasoning), i.e. correct responses for 
the whole test vs. at least one wrong response. 
Probabilistic Reasoning percentages were calculated for 
Non-training group and Training group in the Abstract ver-
sion (74% and 78% respectively), in the Concrete (57% and 
61%), and the Stereotypical version (46% and 63%) (Figure 
1). 
A hierarchical log-linear analyses was performed consid-
ering three variables: Test Version [V] (Abstract, Concrete, 
and Stereotypical), Training [T] (Non-training, Training), 
and Probabilistic Reasoning [R] (Correct, Wrong). Table 1 
presents Likelihood-Ratio chi-square values with the rela-
tive degrees of freedom for the models with a good data fit 
(p> .10) (Knoke & Burke, 1980). Since it was found that 
more than one model provided an adequate fit to the data, 
differences between Likelihood-Ratio chi-square values 
were used to compare the nested models. The χ2 comparison 
statistics indicated that the Model 3 was the most informa-
tive model that described the association in the data. 
It order to further investigate the effects included in 
the selected model, parameter estimates were calculated. 
Among principal effects, Probabilistic Reasoning (z = 5.82, 
p< .001 for Correct) was significant. The interaction effect 
between Version and Probabilistic Reasoning (Table 2) indi-
cated that Abstract version was associated to a higher prob-
ability of Correct, while Stereotypical Version was associ-
ated to a majority of wrong responses. Indeed, no significant 
effect was observed for Concrete version. 
The interaction effect between Training and Probalistic 
Reasonig (Table 3) indicated that Training group obtained 
an overall majority of correct responses in Probabilistic 
Reasoning.  
Figure 1. Percentages of correct responses (with 95% confidence 
intervals) in Probabilistic Reasoning related to task frames and 
training.
Table 3







Note. *p< .05 for a monodirectional hypothesis (df = 1). 
Table 1
Goodness-of-fit and comparisons among models
Model χ 2 df p ∆ χ 2 ∆df p
1. [T] [V,R] 5.48 5 .36 - - -
2. [T,V] [V,R] 5.01 3 .17 ∆(1-2) = 0.47 2 n.s.
3. [V,R] [T,R] 1.64 4 .80 ∆(1-3) = 3.84 1 .05
4. [T,V] [V,R] [T,R] 1.35 2 .51 ∆(3-4) = 4.13 2 n.s.
Table 2
The effect parameter estimates for the interactions between Probabilistic 




Correct 4.26** -1.36 -3.22*
Wrong -4.26** 1.36 3.22*
Note. *p< .01 for a monodirectional hypothesis (df = 2); ** p< .001 for a 
monodirectional hypothesis (df = 2).
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DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to assess students’ con-
ceptual understanding of probability using different frame 
tasks that was hypothesized to be helpful to assess both the 
normative and non-normative reasoning, and exploring the 
effects of formal training on probability.
In line with Hirsch & O’Donnel (2001), it was found 
an overall majority of correct responses. Participants were 
able to indicate the right answers and they correctly pro-
vided a reason for their answers. Nevertheless, there was 
an effect of task frames that affected students’ reasoning. 
Several errors occurred when problems were referred to 
everyday life frames with references to stereotypes in which 
solutions were more frequently associated with non-norma-
tive strategies as well documented by literature on proba-
bilistic intuitive reasoning (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; 
Davidson, 1995; Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Kahneman et al., 
1982; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). These results obtained with 
college students suggested that the instruction they received 
was not effective in terms of conceptual understanding of 
probability, while they appeared to be able to use correctly 
the laws of probability with abstract task, they continue to 
hold misconception when the formal content of the task was 
maintained (i.e. the application of the same rule of probabil-
ity was requested) but the scenarios was modified.
As documented before (Fong & Nisbett, 1991; Fong et 
al., 1986; Lehman et al., 1992), formal training appeared to 
reduce the proportion of errors. Students with formal train-
ing were more likely to adopt normative strategies of resolu-
tion compared to students without formal training. Although 
a substantial number of students with formal training con-
tinued to hold misconceptions (Hirsch & O’Donnel, 2001; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) especially in task with social 
or stereotypical information that still inhibited the norma-
tive resolution. In other words, some students maintained a 
personal way of reasoning about uncertain events character-
ized by real life scenarios. 
Some suggestions to improve statistics and probability 
teaching could be derived from these preliminary results. 
First, tests with different frames can be helpful for teachers 
to assess real understanding and comprehension of statistics 
and probability principles. In other words, these methods 
can help inform instructors about the actual level of stu-
dents’ probabilistic reasoning. Employing only the common 
abstract scenario problems (widely used to illustrate prob-
ability theory in classroom) to assess students’ knowledge 
can be misleading. It is possible that they apply the rule in 
some routine way without an actual understanding of the 
structure of the problem. This limitation can be avoided by 
employing scenarios in which the problem structure had to 
be found beyond the contest in order to apply the principles 
taught correctly.  
Second, starting from the result showing that violations 
of laws of probability continued to occur even after formal 
training, these tasks could be used for instructional inter-
ventions designed specifically to eliminate students’ mis-
conceptions. During typical classroom activities, tasks with 
the same formal contest but with different frames can be 
proposed and compared to stress biases in probabilistic rea-
soning. Students can simultaneously give the right answer 
to explicit probability rules application and show wrong 
responses due to very strong beliefs about non-relevant fac-
ets of the problem. Underlying this paradoxical behavior 
through ad hoc examples could help distinguish relevant vs. 
non-relevant information. Further investigations are needed 
to define and validate appropriate teaching strategies to pro-
mote probability learning.
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